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This paper analyzes the relationship between the size of an economic union and the degree of 
policy centralization. We consider a political economy setting in which elected 
representatives bargain about the degree of centralization within the union. In our model 
strategic delegation affects the identity of the representatives and hence the equilibrium policy 
outcome. We show that the relationship between the size of the union and centralization may 
be non-monotonic: Up to a certain size of the union enlargement leads to deeper integration, 
whereas beyond that size further enlargement implies less centralization. We also show that 
freezing the level of centralization or allowing an associated membership can mitigate the 
trade-off. 
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The recent rounds of enlargement of the European Union have highlighted
the tension that may exist between the size and the scope of an international
union. This topic has featured prominently in the European public debate
for many years, and the common perception seems to be that of a trade-o
between widening and deepening the union. Some observers are skeptical of
further enlargement because they fear that it will hinder deeper integration,
or even endanger the level of cooperation already achieved. Others favor
enlargement precisely because it is perceived as rendering further political
centralization more dicult.
In a seminal paper Alesina et al. (2005) analyze the relationship between
size and scope of unions and identify a trade-o based on the increase in
heterogeneity between member countries as the union grows. This clearly
plays an important role in the European context, as recent new members
in the East tend to be poorer than and structurally dierent from existing
member states. However, the public debate also stresses the sheer increase in
the number of member states|even without causing more heterogeneity|as
potentially aggravating problems of political decision making. In this paper,
we analyze this second aspect focusing on the role of strategic delegation.
In our model legislators bargain about which policies to centralize and
about side-payments between member states. Voters have an incentive to
delegate representation to citizens who benet less from policy centralization
in order to improve the bargaining position of their own country and to
produce side-payments from other member states. In this framework we
derive the eects of changing the number of member states in the union.
This exercise enables us to analyze the relationship between the size of an
economic union and its depth in terms of political integration.
We identify two countervailing eects which inuence the degree of policy
centralization: On the one hand, for given identities of the representatives,
the surplus from policy centralization increases with the number of coun-
tries, since more countries benet from internalized policy spill-overs. Ab-
stracting from strategic delegation, we should therefore observe more policy
centralization as the economic union becomes larger. On the other hand,
the size of the union also aects the incentives for strategic delegation: as
a union incorporates more member states, voters tend to elect politicians
who are less prone to centralization. If the second eect dominates, we have
a trade-o between the size of an economic union and the extent of policy
centralization within the union. Using numerical methods, we show that the
relationship between size and depth of a union may be non-monotonic: For
a large range of parameter values we obtain a hump-shaped pattern: As long
1as the number of member states is small, an enlarged union also becomes
more deeply integrated in terms of policy centralization. Beyond a certain
number of countries, however, the opposite happens and political centraliza-
tion becomes weaker as the union grows. Robustness checks show how the
extent of centralization costs and the relative ease of side-payments aect the
relationship between the number of countries and the degree of cooperation.
Our results have politically relevant normative and positive implications.
From a normative viewpoint, the question concerning the optimal size of an
economic union arises. Our model simulations show how welfare changes with
an increase in the number of countries|in the political economy equilibrium
and in our normative benchmark, the utilitarian optimum. We show that the
welfare gap between these two allocations widens if the union becomes larger.
The benets of enlarging an economic union are lower and, consequently, the
optimal size of the union is smaller than in the absence of the strategic
delegation eect.
On the positive side, existing member states of an economic union may try
to nd some institutional arrangements to fend o potentially detrimental
eects of enlargement on the degree of centralization. For example, they
may invest sunk institutional costs into the extent of integration before they
accept new members, or they may try to x the existing extent of cooperation
constitutionally to prevent a roll-back after an enlargement. There is also
the possibility of dierent degrees of integration:1 For example, new members
may not be integrated into the union as full members but only as associated
countries that do not participate in policy centralization.
Our paper builds on earlier work on strategic delegation in economic
unions.2 Persson and Tabellini (1992) analyze tax competition between two
member states of an economic union. In their model voters can reduce the
intensity of tax competition by delegating decisions on tax rates to rep-
resentatives with a stronger preference for public spending.3 Besley and
Coate (2003) nd an incentive for strategic delegation arising from a com-
mon pool eect: Citizens elect representatives with a strong preference for
public goods, in order to increase the local provision of the public public good,
which is assumed to be nanced from general taxation, Centralized policy
making may then result in an overprovision of local public goods compared
to the preferences of the median voter.4
1See Schneider (2007) on a \discriminatory membership" and also Alesina et al. (2005).
2For recent surveys on the political economy of economic unions see Ruta (2005) and
Lockwood (2006).
3Janeba and Wilson (2005) endogenize the degree of centralization in a tax-competition
model without strategic delegation.
4On strategic delegation with respect to local public good provision see also Chari et al.
2Redoano and Scharf (2004) and Lorz and Willmann (2005) analyze the
inuence of strategic delegation on the centralization decision itself. In Re-
doano and Scharf (2004) two heterogeneous regions decide on the common
supply of a public good. The preference for the public good may either be
weak or strong. Voters in the region with the strong preference can facilitate
consensus with the weak-preference region on centralizing the public good
by electing a weak-preference representative. Lorz and Willmann (2005)
consider a continuum of public goods. Elected representatives bargain over
policy centralization and the regional contributions necessary to nance the
costs of public goods. Strategic delegation then results in too few policies
being centralized.5 Both Redoano and Scharf (2004) and Lorz and Willmann
(2005) deal with the case of only two regions. This paper extends the analysis
to a multi-region framework, thereby allowing us to analyze the relationship
between the number of member states and the degree of centralization in an
economic union.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents
the model of policy centralization. In Section 3 we derive the political equi-
librium. Section 4 provides the numerical simulations on the relationship
between the size of the economic union and the degree of policy centraliza-
tion, section 5 examines possible institutional implications of our model for
alternative modes of enlargement, and section 6 nally concludes.
2 The Model
In this section we develop a political economy model that builds on Lorz and
Willmann (2005). In contrast to our earlier work with 2-country unions, this
paper considers economic unions that can consist of an arbitrary number n of
symmetric countries. This generalization allows us to address the interaction
between the number of member countries and the degree of policy centraliza-
tion. As in our earlier paper, we assume a continuum of local public goods
diering in the extent of positive spill-overs to other countries, measured by
the term . In particular,  is assumed to be distributed uniformly over the
(1997), Cheikbossian (2000), Ferretti and Perotti (2002), and Dur and Roelfsema (2005).
Lockwood (2002) shows in a legislative bargaining model without strategic delegation
that centralized policies may be insensitive to heterogeneous local policy preferences and
thereby nds another potentially welfare-reducing eect of centralized policy-making.
5Related papers dealing with strategic delegation in a bargaining context are Segen-
dor (1998), Buchholz et al. (2005), Facchini et al. (2006), Rota Graziosi (2006), and
Harstad (2007, 2008a, and 2008b). Another related strand of literature is that of strategic
information transmission (see e.g. Olofsgard 2005). None of these papers, however, deals
with the issue of policy centralization.
3unit interval.
Each country is inhabited by a continuum of citizens who dier in their
individual preference for local public goods. The preference intensity is cap-
tured by the parameter  2 [min;max]. The utility of individual  in
country i takes the form:













where c is the consumption of a private good, g() is a local public good with
spill-over , and j is the index for the other member states of the economic
union. As Alesina et al. (2005) we assume that only member countries of
the union send and receive spill-overs. Individual income y is assumed to
be exogenously given, unit costs of transforming private income into public
goods are normalized to one, and governments can raise non-distortionary
taxes to nance public goods. For expositional convenience, we also assume
the average preference   to be equal to the preference  of the median citizen.
Under this weak symmetry assumption, the utilitarian optimum and the rst-
best solution from the perspective of the median voter coincide.
Each public good can be decided on either by a central government or
decentrally. Under decentralized decision-making national governments set
the quantity of public goods non-cooperatively. They ignore the spill-over to
the other member states of the union. Assuming that national governments
maximize aggregate welfare of their jurisdiction, we can derive the quantity
of a local public good in a decentralized setting as:
g
d
i () =   8  2 [0;1] and i = 1:::n : (2)
Under centralized decision making, a common government sets the level of
the public good in each country to maximize aggregate welfare of the whole
union. Note that centralized decision-making does not imply a uniform provi-
sion level, only that the (potentially dierent) provision levels in each country
are decided centrally. These public good levels are then given by:
g
c
i() =  [1 + (n   1)] 8  2 [0;1] and i = 1:::n : (3)
Comparing (2) with (3) shows that a central government supplies a larger
quantity of the public good than a national government. The reason is
that only the central government internalizes the positive spill-overs between
member states. The higher the spill-over  the higher is the supplied level
of the public good under centralization.
4Because of the internalization of spill-overs, the member states of the
union can benet from centralizing the decision on public good supply. At
the same time, however, policy centralization also entails costs: The dis-
advantages of policy centralization discussed in the literature include infor-
mation assymmetries with regard to local conditions, lack of jurisdictional
competition, the distance between subjects and decision-makers resulting in
less democratic accountability, and nally the additional administrative costs
at the center, because centralization of policies | at least in the European
context | hardly ever leads to the down-sizing of local administrations. We
model these costs of centralization in a reduced-form, straightforward way,
by assuming additional xed costs f > 0 for each public good that has its
provision decision taken by the central decision-maker, and an over-head cost
h(n) for the operation of the union as a whole. Note that the latter does
not inuence the centralization decision, it only guarantees a nite welfare
optimum later on in the paper.6
Given these benets and costs of centralization, we dene a \centraliza-
tion surplus" for public good  as the dierence in utility between the cen-
trally decided provision level and the nationally decided level net of the xed
centralization cost. The preceding equations yield a centralization surplus
for citizen  of:
s(;)  [1 + (n   1)]ln(1 + (n   1))    (n   1)   f : (4)
According to equation (4), the centralization surplus increases not only in
the spill-over parameter , but also in the preference for public spending,
. A citizen with a high preference for public goods benets more from
centralization than a citizen with a lower preference for public goods.
From a normative, utilitarian viewpoint, the optimal allocation of decision
powers centralizes all public goods with a positive surplus for the average
citizen. As the surplus increases in the spill-over , we can determine a
critical threshold ~ , which is given by s( ; ~ ) = 0. The provision levels
of all public goods with higher spill-overs than ~  should be decided at the
center by a central government whereas all public goods with a spill-over
below ~  should remain under the authority of national governments. With
 being distributed uniformly, the dierence 1  ~  can be interpreted as the
optimal degree of centralization.
Implicit dierentiation of s( ; ~ ) = 0 gives the inuence of the number






< 0 : (5)
6We assume these over-head cost to take the form h(n) = n.
5The optimal cut-o ~  declines, or in other words the optimal degree of
centralization increases in n. The more member states participate in the
economic union, the more countries can benet from the public good spill-
overs and therefore, the more attractive policy centralization becomes.7
To conclude this section, let us point out that we regard the normative
solution only as a reference point. We now proceed to develop a political
economy model that will oer a positive explanation of the equilibrium degree
of centralization.
3 Equilibrium Degree of Centralization
This section analyzes the centralization decision employing a political econ-
omy framework with the following three-stage structure: In the rst stage,
citizens in each country elect their national representative by majority vote.
All elected representatives then bargain over centralization in the second
stage of the model. The representatives jointly determine the extent of po-
litical cooperation and decide on how to share the cost of centrally decided
policies. In the third stage, the quantities of the local public goods are set|
at the center or at the national level|depending on the allocation of decision
powers.
We solve the model by backward induction: In the last stage policy-
makers decide public good levels by allocating national funds to maximize
the aggregate welfare of their respective jurisdictions. No delegation eects,
agency problems, or other reasons for policy deviations from the welfare max-
imizing benchmark are considered at this stage, and the equilibrium public
good levels are given by equations (2) and (3), respectively. We maintain
this|admittedly somewhat optimistic|assumption in order to focus on the
centralization decision taken in the two previous stages of the game.
In the second stage the allocation of decision powers is decided, taking as
given the identities of the national representatives 
rep
i . The elected repre-
sentatives jointly decide on the spill-over threshold ~ ; furthermore, they de-
termine redistributive side-payments between member states Zi (i = 1:::n).
Including side-payments allows for the possibility that the cost of centralized
policies is not shared uniformly. Instead, by negotiating side-payments, the
representatives eectively bargain over how to share these costs. In order to
solve for the bargaining outcome at this stage, we use the n-player extension
7Note that we are abstracting from country dierences and in particular from core-
periphery considerations. Otherwise, the spill-over term  would also depend on the size



























= 0 : (7)
The quadratic term in the budget constraint is meant to capture eciency
costs of inter-regional transfer payments. The term   0 determines the
extent of these additional costs. For  = 0 all transfers occur lump-sum;
a strictly positive  represents potential distortionary costs of international
transfers, which increase in . By changing , we can analyze in a continuous
fashion how the availability of interregional transfers inuences our results.8
The quadratic specication is chosen for tractability.
The equilibrium policy maximizes the Nash-product in (6) subject to the
constraint from (7). The resulting rst order condition for the equilibrium
side-payments Ze












+ (1 + Z
e
i ) = 0 8i ; (8)
























5 = 0 ; (9)
where  is the Lagrangean multiplier and the superscript e stands for the
equilibrium. Including the budget constraint, we thus have n + 2 equations
that determine the n + 2 unknowns fZe
1;Ze
2;:::;Ze
ng, ~ e, and .
In what follows, we consider only symmetric equilibria in which the iden-
tity of the representative 
rep
i is identical for all countries; that is, we can
8Facchini et al. (2006) and Harstad (2007 and 2008a) compare the limit cases of free
transfers versus prohibitive transfer costs.
7drop the index i and simply write rep. Furthermore, in any symmetric equi-
librium all Ze
i must clearly be zero. As the surplus from centralization is the
same for all representatives, no side-payments are necessary to redistribute
between member states. The cut-o level in the symmetric equilibrium ~ e is









1 + (n   1) ~ 
e

   (n   1) ~ 
e   f = 0 : (10)
The identity of the elected representatives thus determines the degree of
centralization. The stronger the preference for public spending among the
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1 + (n   1) ~ e
i
   (n   1)
< 0 : (11)
Given the solution of the second stage, we can now analyze the rst stage
of our model, the election of national representatives. We do this by looking
at the voting-decision of the decisive median voter. The median citizen in
country i with preference for public spending   chooses 
rep
i to maximize her
indirect utility, taking into account the second and third stage consequences
we derived above:
Vi( ;) = y + Z
e
i +  
Z 1
0




where ~ e and Ze are determined by equations (8) and (9). The rst order
condition of this optimization problem is given by dVi=d
rep












= 0 : (12)
From (8) and (9) the marginal eects of choosing a higher 
rep
i on the equi-
librium degree of centralization and on the equilibrium side-payments can be
9The second order condition implies that the denominator of (11) is positive.
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< 0 : (14)
Noting the signs in (13) and (14), equation (12) can only be satised if
s( ; ~ e) > 0. The fact that the centralization surplus of the average citizen is
positive at ~ e implies that ~ e > ~ . Hence the degree of centralization is inef-
ciently low in the political economy equilibrium. This generalizes our earlier
ndings in Lorz and Willmann (2005) to the case of more than two countries.
The reason for this ineciency result is a strategic delegation eect: Voters
are aware that the identity of the elected national representative inuences
the bargaining outcome. Specically, as the equilibrium side-payment Zi de-
creases in 
rep
i , the median voter of country i has an incentive to choose a
representative with a weaker preference for public spending than herself in
order to receive a positive side-payment from the other countries. In the
symmetric equilibrium, all elected representatives have a weaker preference
for public goods than the median or average citizen, and the resulting degree
of centralization is too low. Commemorating the British rebate and how it
was obtained, one might call this the \Thatcher" eect.
4 Enlargement vs. Deepening
This section analyzes how strategic delegation and the degree of centraliza-
tion change with the number of member states in the union. The point
of departure is the equilibrium condition (12). From (10) we can deter-
mine rep as a function of ~ e. Dierentiating (10) yields @si()=@
rep
i and
@si()=@~ e. Inserting into (12), solving for the integral and employing the
symmetry property of the equilibrium, we can determine the equilibrium de-
gree of centralization ~ e as a function of n. As this expression is not suited
for a straightforward comparative-static exercise, we resort to numerical sim-
ulations in the following.
In our benchmark simulations we set   = 3 , f = 0:5 and  = 0:5. Figure
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Figure 1: Strategic Delegation and the Number of Member States
relative to   in the range n 2 [2;20]. As gure 1 shows, strategic delegation
increases in the number of countries, and the representative's identity rep
deviates further and further away from the median's identity   as the size of
the union increases. The more countries bargain over centralization, the lower
is the inuence of a single representative on the equilibrium ~ e. The marginal
costs of strategic delegation|in terms of sub-optimal centralization|decline
from the view of a single country, and this eect gives voters a stronger
incentive to deviate from their own public good preferences when choosing a
representative.
With respect to the equilibrium degree of centralization 1  ~ e, we there-
fore have two eects working in opposite directions: On the one hand, the
centralization surplus increases for a given 
rep
i as more countries can benet
from the public good spill-over if n increases. On the other hand, 
rep
i declines
in n. Figure 2 depicts the resulting degree of centralization in the political
economy equilibrium and compares it to the normative benchmark. We see
that the gap between the optimum and the equilibrium policy widens as the
number of member states increases. Given our numerical specication, we
obtain a hump-shaped pattern for the equilibrium degree of centralization.
The union rst becomes more deeply integrated as the number of member
states rises and then|in our example for n  5|the equilibrium central-
ization level declines in n. Eventually, strategic motives cause a trade-o







1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 01 11 21 31 41 51 61 71 81 92 02 1





























Figure 2: Centralization and the Number of Member States
To see how the the additional costs of interregional transfers inuence
our results, gure 3 varies  from 0:0 to 1:0. A high  weakens the incentives
for strategic delegation as interregional transfers become more costly. The
decline in rep is less pronounced if  increases. As gure 3 shows, the
equilibrium degree of centralization then follows more closely the optimum.
In fact, for  = 1:0 the level of centralization monotonically increases over
the whole range between n = 2 and n = 20 such that the trade-o between
depth and size of a union vanishes.
Figure 4 shows the inuence of the centralization costs on the model's
predictions. In this gure, we assume a lower f than in the benchmark
(f = 0:1). Not surprisingly, the optimal degree of centralization is already
very high for a low number of member countries. As a result, the curve
representing the optimum is atter than in the benchmark case. Adding
strategic delegation to the picture then results in a maximum for the degree
of centralization already at n = 2. For a higher f than in the benchmark
case, the maximum level of centralization shifts to the right.
Table 1 combines the inuence of f and of  on the equilibrium, reporting
the number of member states which maximizes the degree of centralization
for dierent values of fand .
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Figure 4: Low Fixed Centralization Costs
12 = 0:0  = 0:5  = 0:8
f=0.3 3 4 4
f=0.5 4 5 6
f=0.7 5 6 8
Table 1: Number of Member States for Maximum Centralization
From this table we see that a trade-o emerges for a comparatively small
number of member states if either the xed costs f or the redistribution
costs  are low.
Figure 5 depicts the welfare eects of strategic delegation.10 In the gure
we compare the welfare of the average voter in the political economy equilib-
rium with the welfare in the utilitarian optimum|for the moment disregard
the middle curve that we return to discuss in the next section. We see that
as the number of member countries n rises, the welfare level in the politi-
cal equilibrium increasingly falls short of the optimal level. In other words,
the larger the political union becomes, the higher is the welfare loss due to
strategic delegation. We also see from the diagram that there is an optimal
size of the union that maximizes aggregate welfare of each member state.
Strategic delegation inuences this optimal union size. Whereas welfare of
each member is maximized at 32 member countries in our numerical example
if the optimal degree of centralization is chosen, the welfare maximizing size
of the union declines to 24 countries in the political economy equilibrium.
The detrimental political eects due to strategic delegation thus reduce the
optimal size of an economic union.
5 Alternative Modes of Enlargement
The negative welfare eect of enlarging the union beyond a certain size is
brought about by ever more conservative representatives coming to power
because of strategic delegation. This raises the question whether there exist
safeguards or alternative forms of enlargement that avoid this drawback in
the political arena. Clearly, this question of constitutional design takes one
step further than the positive theory developed so far.
Consider an economic union of a certain size which decides about the
entry of new members. In order to prevent a roll-back of centralization, the
existing members may try to preserve the status-quo degree of centralization
before they take in new member states. This can be achieved, for example,
10We again use the numerical values assumed so far, as well as  = 0:002 and  = 3 for
the overhead cost.
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Figure 5: Enlargement with \ratchet" eect
by means of constitutional treaties|the treaties of Rome, Maastricht, and
Lisbon are cases in point. The eects of such an institutional \ratchet"
mechanism are depicted in Figure 5. In constructing this gure we assume
that the centralization level rst grows gradually with the size of the union,
but once it reaches the maximum it stays at that level as the union grows
further. As Figure 5 shows, such a rule raises the optimal size of the union
compared to the benchmark case. The reason for this is that beyond the
maximum level of centralization (which occurs at n = 5 in the numerical
example at hand) the institutional \ratchet" eect prevents the welfare loss
associated with the decline in centralization that would otherwise take eect.
Another possible strategy to prevent a decline in centralization is to admit
additional countries only as associated members of the union. An associated
country receives and provides spill-overs just like a full member state, but
it does not participate in policy centralization. Compared to granting full
membership, an associated membership keeps the degree of centralization of
the newly enlarged union unchanged. Another additional advantage of an
associated membership is that the membership costs are presumably lower
for an associated country than for a full member. These potential benets of
an associated membership have to be compared to the disadvantage of not
internalizing the spill-overs.
Figure 6 depicts the welfare gain from admitting a new member state as an
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Figure 6: Enlargement and Associated Membership
associated member, given that the union has n full members.11 With regard
to the membership cost, we consider the specication g(n+s) = 0:002(n+s)3,
where s 2 [0;1] measures the contribution of an associated member to the
membership cost. If s equals zero the associated member does not cause
additional costs, whereas s = 1 describes the (somewhat unrealistic) case
that membership costs for an associated member are as high as for a full
member. We see from Figure 6 that the additional welfare from admitting
an associated member may be higher than from admitting an additional full
member if the number of member states is suciently high (to the right of
the intersection point). This is only the case, however, if we assume that
membership costs are suciently lower for an associated member than for a
full member. In Figure 6 we have used s = 0:3, whereas the case s = 1:0 is
represented by the dotted line.
Notice one interesting alternative interpretation of the result just derived:
Instead of viewing s < 1 (solely) as the result of the lower cost of an associated
membership, we can also interpret (part of) the dierence as a membership
fee the associated country has to pay to the existing full members. This
does not reduce the actual cost, but it does reduce its eect on the welfare
of existing members, as part of it is recovered in form of the dues paid by
the associated member. In practise, countries associated to the EU pay
11Note that we could provide similar graphs for admitting more than one associated
member.
15membership fees and this renders associated membership more attractive as
an alternative form of enlargement.
6 Concluding Remarks
The nexus between the size of an international union and the extent of coop-
eration between its members is an important aspect of international policy
coordination. In this paper, we set up a political economy model that al-
lows us to analyze this relationship. Our model features symmetric countries
with heterogeneous agents who strategically select national representatives.
These representatives then bargain over the extent of policy centralization,
and how much each member state should pay for centralized policies.
We show that strategic delegation gives rise to representatives with a
low preference for public spending, and how this adverse political eect be-
comes worse as the number of member countries increases. The strategic
delegation eect of union enlargement counteracts and eventually dominates
the increasing potential for the internalization of spill-overs. As a result, a
hump-shaped pattern between the size of the union and the degree of policy
centralization may emerge; that is, beyond a certain size we face a trade-o
between further enlargement and deeper integration.
Our results complement nicely the earlier work by Alesina et al. (2005)
who analyze the role of an increase in heterogeneity between asymmetric
member states if the union grows larger. We consider symmetric countries
but propose a model of the political process in which an increase in union size
aggravates ineciencies in political decision making. Both hypotheses feature
prominently in the public debate on further EU enlargement. Understand-
ing and addressing them seems to be of utmost importance for European
integration to continue.
We also discuss two extensions of our model: First, we let existing mem-
bers of the union x the degree of centralization at the status-quo level before
they let in new members. With such a \ratchet" mechanism in place, the
existing members of the union avoid a decline in the degree of centralization
which would otherwise result from an enlargement. Second, we analyze an as-
sociated membership as an alternative to admitting additional full members.
An associated member country sends and receives spill-overs just as a full
member, but does not participate in the centralization of public goods. Both
possibilities can mitigate the trade-o between enlargement and deepening
of an economic union, however, in the case of an associated membership at
the cost of not internalizing spill-overs by these countries.
With respect to future work, we can extend our model to include asym-
16metric countries in order to analyze the interplay between the size of a union,
the heterogeneity of its member countries and the incentives for strategic
delegation in one unied framework. For example, spill-overs could decline
with distance so that countries located at the core send and receive more
spill-overs than countries at the periphery. A growing union then becomes
increasingly heterogeneous with respect to the preferred level of centraliza-
tion. A second, promising avenue is to develop a genuinely dynamic model
of centralization and union expansion which treats enlargement as a sequen-
tial process. Such a sequential model will allow us to analyze the strategic
interaction between decisions taken at dierent points in time. Furthermore,
old member countries and new entrants then dier with respect to their fall
back option when it comes to enlargement. Both extensions of our model
appear far from trivial, and we leave them for future research.
Appendix
This appendix derives the marginal eects of 
rep
i on Ze
i and ~ e holding all

rep
j (j 6= i) constant. As we depart from the symmetric equilibrium, we can
summarize all countries j 6= i by a representative country  i.
With si = s(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we can write the rst order
















































Combining (A.1) with (A.2) leads to:
(1 + Z
e
i )  ~ s
e








 i = 0 : (A.3)
In addition, the budget constraint has to be satised:
Z
e
















Equations (A.1), (A.3) and (A.4) determine the three unknowns, Ze
i , Ze
 i
and ~ e. Totally dierentiating these three equations, setting d
rep
 i = 0, and
employing the symmetry properties Ze
i = Ze




 i , and ~ se









































i = 0 ; (A.6)
dZ
e
i + (n   1)dZ
e
 i = 0 : (A.7)
From (A.6){(A.7) we can derive equations (13) and (14) of the text.
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